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Is there an end to our scientiﬁc quest? This question that continues to divide the scientiﬁc
community between those who believe that the progress of science is inﬁnite and those
who think that we already understand how the universe works and no major discoveries
are to be expected in the future. This article explores the philosophical worldview of
modern science that has given rise to this question. It argues that an approach to
knowledge that focuses on the process of construction of knowledge rather than its
products offers a possibility of deﬁnitively answering this question and opening paths
for a more rational approach in advancing and managing the scientiﬁc progress.
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In 1996, John Horgan, then a senior writer for
Scientiﬁc American, wrote a book that made quite
a stir in the science community. The title of the
book was very provocative: The End of Science:
Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of
the Scientiﬁc Age (Horgan, 1996). As the title
indicates, the author made a claim that modern
science had reached its limit. Horgan argued that
although some incremental progress was still
occurring and might even continue to occur for
some time, nothing comparable to the theory of
relativity, quantum mechanics or the discovery
of the structure of DNA was even in the realm
of possibilities. Science simply already made all
the major advances there were to be made; our
understanding of how the universe worked
was, on the whole, completed.
Responses to Horgan’s book revealed sharp
divisions in the scientiﬁc community. Numerous
disagreements with the arguments and the main
conclusion of the book ranged from well-
mannered academic criticisms to sharp vitriolic
attacks. John Maddox, former editor of the
Sciencemagazine, for example, produced a lengthy
book entitled What Remains to Be Discovered in
which he politely challenged Horgan’s contentions
and outlined major areas of science where signiﬁ-
cant advances should take place in the future. By
contrast, biologist Stephen Gould described
Horgan’s book as ‘boring’ and physicist Stephen
Hawking called it ‘nonsense’. There were also
much harsher reactions that revealed raw
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emotions, irritation and even anger. Horgan was
called a quack and a phony whose views of con-
temporary science were extremely subjective, ill
informed and very biased.
However, there were a signiﬁcant number of
scientists who, on the whole, agreedwith Horgan’s
arguments and did not dispute his reading of the
facts. Like Horgan, they believed that in its main
contours, the work of science had been completed
and no major illuminations awaited us in the
future. Biologist Kenneth Miller, for example,
observed that ‘at the core of his [Horgan’s] thesis
was an observation that met with agreement
among most of the scientists I know—namely, that
in a general way, we really do understand how
nature works’ (Horgan, 2008, p. 43).
The book deﬁnitely touched the nerve in the
scientiﬁc community. Unlike some critics of
science from among its opponents (e.g., religious
extremists), Horgan was, for many decades (and
continues to be), an integral part of the scientiﬁc
scene. He was well informed about scientiﬁc
developments and had written a great deal on
the subject. He received numerous awards for
his writings about science; his contributions
appeared in some of the most prestigious publica-
tions both in the United States and around the
world. He personally knew many distinguished
scientists. In a word, Horgan was deﬁnitely an
insider. His pessimistic conclusions did not spring
up from some anti-scientiﬁc persuasion but from
the very midst of the modern scientiﬁc scene.
By his own admission, Horgan was a believer
in the open-endedness of science and its inﬁnite
progress. His ﬁrst doubts appeared at the end of
the 1980s largely in response to proud afﬁrma-
tions of the capacity of modern science to solve
the remaining mysteries of the universe. Stephen
Hawking, for example, categorically declared in
1988 that there was a good chance that ‘the study
of the early universe and the requirements of
mathematical consistency will lead us to a
complete uniﬁed theory within the lifetime of
some of us who are around today’ (Horgan,
2008, p. 43). Although Hawking later retracted
this statement (Hawking, 2003), there are still
many physicists who continue the search for the
elusive ﬁnal theory of everything. The European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) has
spent over 10 billion dollars on the Large Hadron
Collider to search for the so-called god particle—
the Higgs boson—that is supposed to explain
gravity and, thus, solve the last mystery of the
physical universe. What is going to happen when
the last mystery is solved? Where would physics
go then? In his book, The End of Science, Horgan
describes his interview in 1989 with distin-
guished physicist Roger Penrose. Their conversa-
tion drifted to the theory of everything—a theory
that is supposed to unite all known physical
forces in nature and provide the ultimate answer
to the puzzle of the universe. ‘Solving mysteries
is a wonderful thing to do’, Penrose ruminated.
‘And if they were all solved, somehow, that
would be rather boring’ (Horgan, 1996, p. 3).
Penrose’s words were a revelation for Horgan.
Indeed, if the ﬁnal theory is attained, what does it
mean for the scientiﬁc enterprise? Does that mean
the end of the scientiﬁc quest? After all, how much
is there to know? As we learn more about the fun-
damental aspects of reality, is it possible that we
will one day learn it all? ‘In the same way’, Horgan
argues, ‘scientists might be unlikely to discover
anything surpassing the big bang, or quantum
mechanics, or relativity, or natural selection, or
DNA-based genetics’ (Horgan, 2004, p. 38).
The publication of The End of Science has had
no signiﬁcant practical consequences for the
scientiﬁc community. Scientists continue to do their
research as they had had for many years before the
publication of the book. The controversy has
largely subsided. However, the problem that
the book raised has not gone away, and the ques-
tions the book asked have remained unanswered
(Ben-Ari, 2007), and they are interesting questions.
Indeed, many of us are brought up to believe that
the progress of science and knowledge will be
inﬁnite. However, why should this progress be
inﬁnite? Can our belief be proven? In his review
of John Maddox’s riposte to Horgan for The New
York Times, Paul Raeburn, while recognizing that
Maddox makes a persuasive case for the future
development of science, adds
Does that mean Horgan was wrong? It may
take a few centuries to ﬁnd out. Horgan recalls
the early explorers, to whom the swelling seas
seemed inﬁnite. They were wrong; but
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perhaps the belief sustained them (The New
York Times, January 10, 1999).
The debates that have followed the publication
of The End of Science have largely focused on
whether Horgan is right or wrong. This approach
has not proven to be particularly productive. No
consensus has emerged between those whom
Mordechai Ben-Ari calls accelerationists and the
end-of-science scholars (Ben-Ari, 2007, p. 20).
This paper will take a different approach. Rather
than deal with the existing division among scien-
tists and decide who is right and who is wrong, it
will focus on the possible source of this problem.
Why has this problem come up in the ﬁrst
place? What is it in the contemporary scientiﬁc
worldview that has made the emergence of
this problem possible? To answer this question,
one needs to examine the worldview of contem-
porary science.
The philosophical perspective that dominates
modern scientiﬁc worldview is realism. John
Searle provides the following succinct deﬁnition
of realism:
Realism is the view that there is a way that things
are that is logically independent of all human
representations. Realism does not say how things
are but only that there is a way that they are
(Searle, 1995, p. 155; emphasis in the original).
According to Searle, the realist view of the
world has the following structural features
(Searle, 1995, pp. 150–51)1 :
(1) World (or alternatively, reality or the universe)
exists independently of our representations of it.
(2) Human beings have a variety of interconnected
ways of having access to and representing
features of the world to themselves.
(3) Some of these representations .purport to be
about and to represent how things are in
reality. To the extent that they succeed or fail,
they are said to be true or false, respectively.
They are true if and only if they correspond
to the facts in reality.
(4) Systems of representation are human crea-
tions, and to that extent arbitrary.
(5) Complete epistemic objectivity is difﬁcult,
sometimes impossible.
(6) Having knowledge consists in having true
representations for which we can give certain
sorts of justiﬁcation or evidence. Knowledge
is thus by deﬁnition objective in the epistemic
sense, because the criteria for knowledge are
not arbitrary, and they are impersonal.
As one can see from the above, the realist
perspective does not promise a complete know-
ledge of reality; rather, and rather pessimistically,
it promises only an inﬁnite asymptotic approxi-
mation to such knowledge. Also, according to
this perspective, our knowledge in the ﬁnal
analysis depends on the reality external to our
mind; this reality is the ultimate arbiter in deter-
miningwhat constitutes knowledge andwhat does
not. Validation of knowledge involves a ﬁt between
a theory and the way things are. As a deﬁnition
standard among realists goes, knowledge is
‘justiﬁed true belief’. It means that to constitute
knowledge a belief must be true, that is, it should
correspond, at least approximately, to the way
reality is independently of our theory (David, n.d.;
Searle, 1995; Otte, 1990; Weston, 1992). In other
words, the ﬁt is a necessary condition of know-
ledge; without it, a belief cannot be considered true
and, therefore, cannot constitute knowledge.
Thus, as one can see, the dominant view of
modern science is that reality external to our
mind validates scientiﬁc knowledge. It is only
fair to acknowledge that on close reading the
view of validation implies a strong possibility
that science may indeed come to an end or at
least to an end of big discoveries. One can submit
several considerations in support of this apparent
possibility. First of all, because of our constitution
and the constitution of the physical universe, our
access to the reality external to our mind and
available for validation is limited. According to
modern science, we live in a universe where
nothing can exceed the speed of light. This uni-
verse may or may not be inﬁnite, but because of
our physical limitations and the laws of nature,
we can physically see only so far in our universe.
Our universe has a horizon beyond which our
gaze does not penetrate. To put it simply, we
cannot see or hear anything that does not reach
1 For reasons of convenience and economy, I provide a slightly
abridged verbatim version.
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us. The Big Bang is the ultimate limit to how far
we can see into the history of our universe. Also,
we cannot see what is going on inside a black
hole because gravity prevents light from reaching
us. Still, another example of what one might call
a natural limitation is the principle of uncertainty
that is widely accepted in our theorizing about
subatomic events. In accordance with this
principle, there is no way we can know the actual
state of a particle or a quantum system as it is
irrespective of our experimental tools. We cannot,
in principle, know the exact state of reality at the
subatomic level but only its statistical probability.
This is not to argue that our universe is inﬁnite
or ﬁnite. It may very well be inﬁnite, but we have
access only to its ﬁnite part. Because the accepted
method of validation requires the establishment
of one-to-one correspondence, our knowledge
about the inaccessible part of the universe cannot
be validated and, therefore, does not constitute,
according to the existing standards, proper
knowledge. It is simply a speculation at best.
Second, our current theory of evolution also
supports the view that our capacity to know,
even when enhanced by technological devices,
is limited. The evolution made us ﬁt to survive
in this world, not to know it; our senses are
shaped by the evolution for the purposes of sur-
vival. Our knowledge that, according to science,
is based on our senses is merely a survival tool.
In other words, we need knowledge only to the
extent required by our survival, and because
there are aspects of reality that are not essential
for our survival, we may very well never know
anything about them. Finally, science is about
discovering the laws of nature, and the number
of these laws, however big it may be, still must
be ﬁnite. If it were not, reality would be chaotic,
and it is not. Therefore, there are only so many
laws of nature that we can discover.
In light of these considerations, one may very
well conclude that reality accessible to us limited
creatures is limited and therefore our knowledge
of it also has a limit. Moreover, according to real-
ism, we may be able only to approximate this
limit without ever reaching it. In accordance with
the dominant approach to validation of know-
ledge, whatever ideas or beliefs we may form
about the rest of reality, these ideas and beliefs
cannot, in principle, be validated and, therefore,
cannot constitute knowledge.
Although the realist perspective on knowledge
dominates the modern scientiﬁc worldview, it is
not unopposed. There are numerous philosoph-
ical perspectives that disagree with realism.
Despite their differences and even incompatibil-
ities, they share some common features and are
usually grouped together under the general
rubric of anti-realism (for an overview of realism
and anti-realism, see Psillos, 1999; Ladyman, 2001;
Searle, 1995). Broadly speaking, anti-realism is a
philosophical critique of the main tenets of realism.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into all the
speciﬁcs of issues contested by realism and anti-
realism. Although their number is extensive, they
largely boil down to one fundamental disagree-
ment over the issue of validation. In contrast to
realists, anti-realists maintain that we can never
be sure how things actually are because a ﬁt
between a theory and data is insufﬁcient for truth
claims. Paul Horwich, for example, offers the
following generalization:
It [anti-realism] derives from an impression of
conﬂict between the alleged autonomy of the
facts (their independence of us) and their
accessibility (the possibility of our gaining
knowledge of their existence). Consequently,
it seems to the anti-realist that something of
our naive point of view must be given up;
some philosophical move must be made
(Horwich, 1996, p. 188).
In support of their argument, anti-realists refer
to numerous theories in the past that ﬁtted well
with empirical data but have ultimately proven
to be false (e.g., the theory of ﬂat Earth, the
theory that placed Earth in the center of our
planetary system or the ether theory of light).
They also point to the phenomenon of under-
determination (i.e., the existence of different and
often conﬂicting theories that are supported by
the same empirical evidence) as a proof that a
ﬁt is no guarantee of the validity of a theory (on
underdetermination, see Hoefer and Rosenberg,
1994; Leplin, 1997; Bergström, 1984; Cordero,
2001; Belousek, 2005).
As one can see, in the anti-realist perspective,
we cannot make truth claims based on the
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validation by a ﬁt between theory and fact. In
this perspective, knowledge is not circumscribed
by external reality and, therefore, is not limited to
the states that the world may be in. Clearly, such
view frees knowledge from being dependent on
reality for validation; the progress of knowledge
can be inﬁnite. However, this freedom comes at
a price. In accordance with the anti-realist view,
this knowledge is not about anything except our
capacity to create. Knowledge has nothing to do
with truth; it is relativistic. Although anti-realists
reject the realist approach to validation, they offer
no adequate approach of their own.
Thus, the realist position maintains that science
can attain true knowledge about reality, but the
dependence that they establish between know-
ledge and the reality external to our mind cannot
explicitly reject a possibility that scientiﬁc explor-
ation may, at some point, come to an end. The
anti-realist perspective, on the other hand,
provides a strong support to the idea that the
progress of our knowledge is inﬁnite, but they
also assert that this knowledge has little, if
anything, to do with the way reality actually is.
Neither of these positions seems to be satisfactory.
We are reluctant to accept the notion that our
scientiﬁc exploration will come to an end, but at
the same time, we do not want to give up the
notion that our science provides us with true
understanding of how things are. Unfortunately,
there just does not seem to be any possibility for
reconciling these two positions.
For the purposes of this paper, I want to point
out that despite signiﬁcant differences between
the realists and the anti-realists, in one very
important respect, their worldviews are very
similar: they both posit a gap between the subject
and the object. As has already been indicated, the
realists believe that this gap can be mediated,
whereas the anti-realists think that such medi-
ation is impossible. The gap between the knower
and reality indicates that traditional dualism still
plays an important role in both perspectives. This
dualism can be traced back to the early periods in
the evolution of human thought. Plato, for
example, believed that mind and body were
ontologically distinct. The division between
thought and reality, mind and matter, body and
soul, subject and object, and the knower and the
known is characteristic for much of the
European, and not only European, intellectual
tradition (Dickens, 2010; Robinson, 2011).2
However, is the positing of this gap justiﬁed? Is it
supported by empirical evidence?
In his remarkable study, The Origin of Intelligence
in Children and in his other books, Piaget provides a
very detailed empirical account and analysis of the
development of symbolic thought (Piaget, 1998).
Piaget shows that the process of construction of
symbolic representations is bi-directional. On
one hand, it constructs mental representations of
objects, and on the other, it also develops
consciousness or what we often call the subject.
Thus, one can see that the same process is involved
in the construction of both the subject and the
object and intimately relates one to the other. The
constructed object and the constructed subject are
not mere mental categories; they are represented
by the physical organization of neurons and neural
networks.
Based on what we know about the way our
thinking operates, we can conclude the following:
(1) There is no ontological gap that separates the
subject and the object. The ontological status
of this gap is not supported by empirical
evidence. Both the subject and the object are
products of the same process of construction.
(2) The ontological distinction between thought
and reality is also unsupported by empirical
evidence. As organization of neurons and
neural networks, thought is merely one of the
forms of organization of reality. In other words,
it is reality. In fact, it is the most powerful form
of organization of reality. Unlike other forms of
organization of reality, the process of organizing
and re-organizing neurons and neural circuits
has no limitations and is capable of inﬁnite
number of combinations.
Empirical evidence shows that symbolic thought
emerges as a result of combinations of neural
networks that conserve sensori-motor operations
by regulating them. Although neural networks
regulate sensori-motor operations, they, in turn,
2 In philosophy of science, dualism often refers to the dichotomy be-
tween the ‘subject’ (the observer) and the ‘object’ (the observed). Criti-
cism of Western science may label this kind of dualism as a ﬂaw in the
nature of science itself.
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also need to be conserved—the function that is
performed by their own regulatory operations.
The combination of these regulatory operations
leads to the emergence of mental images—a new
level of organization represented by a new func-
tioning organization of neurons and neural circuits.
The conservation of these new functioning opera-
tions also requires regulatory operations and so
on and so forth. Thus, conservation and regulation
play a crucial role in the creation of new forms of
organization of reality. Conservation is the real
drive of this process, and regulation makes conser-
vation possible. Conservation of regulatory opera-
tions also requires regulation of these operations.
It is always possible and even necessary for the
purposes of conservation to construct another
level of regulation. Given the number of neurons
in an average human brain and their plasticity—
the fact that there are no physical limitations to
their combinatorial capacity—the number of
possible combinations that their networks can
compose is inﬁnite.
It is also important to remember that the evo-
lution of human thought has an important social
dimension. Conservation of symbolic represen-
tations also takes place in the inter-subjective
space, not just inside an individual brain.
Human thinking evolved as a cooperative social
activity. Language is an important tool that
serves this inter-subjective mode of conservation
and symbolic construction. The spontaneous
organization of interacting brains combined
with technology that supports and enhances
our mental activity (such as computers, the inter-
net, various data repositories, etc.) vastly
increases our capacity to construct new forms
of organization of reality with increased com-
binatorial power. Each new level of organization
is more powerful than the one it regulates
because it offers more combinatorial possibil-
ities; the forms of organization that each new
level regulates become merely particular cases
in a more general organized whole. Unlike other
forms of organization of reality, organization of
reality that involves symbolic thought has no
limitations; it is, in fact, inﬁnite.
The empirical evidence related to the emergence
and development of human thought does not
support the positing of the ontological gap between
thought and reality, mind and matter, subject and
object, the knower and the object of knowing. This
gap is not a product of empirical observation; it
is an example of what Kant called synthetic a
priori judgment or what we more commonly call
self-evident or common sense truth. As the term
indicates, common sense truth is not a product of
rational judgment. The word ‘sense’ indicates
connection to biological factors, whereas the word
‘common’ suggests coherence—the fact that this
knowledge is a product of an agreement among
knowers. Neither of these terms signiﬁes any
connection to rational and critical assessment. The
commonly accepted belief regarding the unbridge-
able gap that separates the subject from the object
does not exist in reality. It appears only if the
process of construction is excluded from our
conception of knowledge production. We all have
an immediate experience of this process. Without
it, wewould not be able to know anything. It is real
and so are its products—new forms of organization
of reality represented by new organizations of
neurons and neural circuits.
The controversy that has surfaced in connec-
tion with Horgan’s book is not accidental. Its
source is the worldview held by contemporary
science and, speciﬁcally, its conception of know-
ledge production. This conception fails to
recognize and embrace the very source of our
knowledge—the process of construction that
generates reality. Our knowledge production is
an integral part of this process. Our capacity to
produce knowledge is inﬁnite. This capacity is
the most compelling proof against Horgan’s
assertion that our scientiﬁc quest will come to
an end. It is also a convincing proof—in fact,
the only deﬁnite proof we can have—that reality
is inﬁnite because our capacity to shape and
reshape it is inﬁnite. We are the agents who have
the potential to make reality inﬁnite, and our
true destiny as a civilization is to realize this
potential.
The controversy that this article originally set
out to explore leads to a different set of questions
that transcend the boundaries of its original
subject. How do we realize our inﬁnite potential
for constructing reality? What are the best condi-
tions to sustain and enhance this potential? How
will its realization affect our life?
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These questions are not new. Many thinkers
from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment
and down to our own time have asked these
questions in one form or another. They were
captivated by the power of human thought;
many of them devoted their lives and careers to
seeking ways in which the power of human
intellect could be harnessed for the beneﬁt of
humanity. Their visions continue to inspire us in
our quest for inﬁnite progress, rationally
organized political and social order, economic
prosperity, and world without violence and wars.
Although these goals remain elusive, the inspir-
ation is enduring. We continue to believe that
control over the power of our knowing will open
unlimited possibilities for humanity.
C. West Churchman is one of the most import-
ant and inﬂuential thinkers who pursued this
quest in recent times. His book, The Design of
Inquiring Systems, is an extensive, insightful, and
engaging exploration of various approaches to
understanding the production of knowledge
and the most efﬁcient ways of organizing this
production (Churchman, 1971). It is certainly
beyond the scope of this article to provide a
detailed and exhaustive examination of Church-
man’s ideas—an enterprise that would require a
full book-length study. However, it is quite appro-
priate to engage some of the seminal themes of
his works in the following reﬂections.
The theoretical perspective outlined in this
article builds to a signiﬁcant degree on
major themes of Churchman’s heritage. It fully
embraces his vision of progressively expanding
nested levels and forms of organization that he
sees as characteristic for inquiring systems. It is
an inclusive vision of a democratic and coopera-
tive process. In this regard, Churchman’s
thinking about design of inquiring systems and
the way they operate stands in sharp contrast to
the prevalent practice in the contemporary
scientiﬁc community.
As has been shown, the dominant conception
of knowledge production in the scientiﬁc
community does not recognize the role of the
process of construction and does not incorporate
this process. This failure has several conse-
quences. First of all, without incorporating the
process of construction, one cannot see the vital
connection that always exists between the subject
and the object. The world appears as ontologic-
ally divided by an unbridgeable gap. The discord
between the realists and the anti-realists that
plagues our intellectual community is a result of
this division. This discord works against an
objective and comprehensive understanding of
reality, discourages critical introspection on both
sides and ultimately hinders our scientiﬁc
progress. The overall situation is disorienting
for all involved. The failure to recognize the
process of construction makes realists oblivious
to the impact of subjectivity and leads to frequent
uncritical projection of speciﬁc theoretical
conceptions on reality. Insensitivity to the prob-
lem of subjectivity often tempts members of the
scientiﬁc community to substitute their own
theoretical perspective for reality. Claims that
external reality fully validates theory merely con-
ceal a triumphant subjectivism clad in the mantle
of objectivity. The anti-realists do not fare much
better and only add to overall theoretical
confusion. Their emphasis on subjectivity merely
renders all knowledge relativistic. In their case,
reality appears as ultimately inaccessible to
human reason. As one can see, both approaches
are ultimately not conducive to a successful
scientiﬁc enterprise.
The problem of validation is another important
consequence of the failure to embrace the process
of construction. Anti-realists simply dismiss this
problem. In their view, all knowledge is relativis-
tic—a view that leads to a facile conclusion that
no knowledge is valid. By contrast, realists claim
that knowledge can be validated by the reality
external to our mind. Their approach also does
not solve the problem. Human thought is by far
the most powerful form of organization of reality.
Because it is the most powerful form, are we
justiﬁed in using other and much less powerful
forms of organization to validate knowledge?
The obvious answer is no. The less powerful
forms cannot validate more powerful ones. They
cannot fully encompass all the possibilities of
these forms. Conversely, because of the greater
power of symbolic operations, there are no obsta-
cles that can, in principle, prevent establishing
correspondence between thought and the reality
external to our mind. Scientiﬁc theories of the
Syst. Res. RESEARCH PAPER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 30, 43–55 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/sres.
Science and its Discontents 49
past, such as ﬂat Earth or the geocentric theory of
the universe, were perfectly capable of establish-
ing such one-to-one correspondence. Underdeter-
mination also shows that pronouncing any
theory to be a unique explanation of empirical
data is ultimately a very problematic claim.
Churchman was keenly aware of the problem
of validation or what he saw as the problem of
the guarantor of the validity of knowledge
(Churchman, 1971, pp. 274–75). In his efforts to
resolve this problem, Churchman combined the
legacy of American pragmatism and the intuition
about syncretism of human intelligence that
perceived an intimate connection between
knowledge, on one hand, and ethical and
aesthetic values, on the other. He sought to coun-
ter the relativistic implications of pragmatism by
associating knowledge production with the
pursuit of ideals, both ethical and aesthetic.
(Ulrich, 2004). Although this approach opened
new and very productive directions in Church-
man’s quest, it ultimately has not resolve the
problem of subjectivity and relativism. As he
soberly acknowledged at the end of The Design
of Inquiring Systems, the problem of the relation-
ship between relativism and non-relativism still
remained, in his view, the most important
philosophical problem of the 20th century.
(Churchman, 276).
Churchman’s most enduring legacy is his
profound belief in human capacity to know—a
capacity that is inﬁnite and yet one that we can
grasp and understand in its totality. He pursued
this quest for objective and universal knowledge
throughout his intellectual career. The perspec-
tive that centers on the process of construction
follows up in this quest and seeks to shed new
light on the problems of subjectivity, relativism,
and objective and universal knowledge that
Churchman confronted in his work.
The following observations may be a good
starting point in addressing these problems. If,
indeed, there is some dimension that allows
observing reality in its entirety, we should have
access to this dimension precisely because it must
be truly universal and must include our activity.
Also, if this dimension is truly universal, the
knowledge we gain from this dimension should
cover all the future forms of organization of
reality and not just forms that exist now or have
existed in the past. Finally, objectivity and
universality requires that knowledge should
critically incorporate the process of knowing, that
is, the knower, or observer, should be part of
knowing/observing.
The most essential characteristic of reality is its
dynamic character. Reality never stands still; it
constantly evolves, constantly creates new forms.
We, humans, are one of the forms of organization
of reality, and we are endowed with the same
capacity for creating new forms as the rest of
reality. Therefore, we do have full access to the
most essential dimension of reality.
The past and the present of our universe is the
story of the construction of new forms. We have
every reason to believe that such continued
construction will also be the future of our
universe (unless, of course, we destroy our-
selves). The fact that we can produce knowledge
inﬁnitely and that our knowledge is one of the
forms of the organization of reality supports this
view. Therefore, through understanding the
process of construction, we, in a way, gain some
knowledge about all forms that this process can
create—past, present and future. We may not
know in all details what speciﬁc forms this
process and we will produce in the future, but,
as this article argues, we can know how they
will be produced.
Objective and universal knowledge should
incorporate the activity of knowing, that is, the
process of construction itself. In other words, it
should include the observer/knower into the
ﬁeld of observation. However, how can we
observe the process of construction and ourselves
without entering into inﬁnite regress? Observing
the process of construction requires constructing
a position from which this process can be
observed. What such observational position
requires seems impossible: to observe the process
of construction, one must construct a position
outside this process. However, how can one be
outside the process of construction because
taking such position also involves construction?
How is it possible to be inside and outside the
process at the same time? Is not this a contradic-
tion? In other words, can one reﬂect on the
process of construction itself?
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As has been pointed out earlier, the process of
construction involves regulation. Regulation is
essentially a reﬂective function. The fact that the
process of construction is inﬁnite may suggest,
as it does to Niklas Luhmann, that there is really
no way to reﬂect on the process of construction
because for every reﬂective position, there will
always be a possibility of constructing another
one (Luhmann, 1984, p. 479). Every point of
reﬂection can and will be succeeded by
another one, no less embedded in the process
of observing/constructing than its predecessor.
Should one conclude, then, that the problem of
the embedded observer/knower cannot be
resolved and all that is left is to rely on palliatives,
such as Luhmann’s conditioning (Luhmann, 1984,
p. 485)?
It is logically correct to regard, as Churchman
has, the process of construction itself as a system.
Just like any other system, it requires
stabilization and, therefore, regulation that offers
a possibility of reﬂection. If the process of
construction requires regulation, there must exist
a position from which one should be able to
reﬂect on the entire process without at the same
time being outside of this process.
As has been indicated earlier, conservation
and regulation are at the heart of the process
of construction. Conservation of functional
operations requires regulation. At its inception,
the regulatory operation is unstable. To stabilize
itself, it needs its own regulatory operation that
marks the inception of a new level of
organization that also needs to be stabilized.
Thus, the process of construction combines both
equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both equilib-
rium and disequilibrium are dynamically
related in the process of construction. An in-
crease in equilibrium, or entropy, on one level
of organization leads, at the same time, to an
equal increase in disequilibrium, or order, be-
cause it generates a new and more powerful
level of organization that regulates this level.
This conception of the process of construction
is in total agreement with the second law of
thermodynamics that says that entropy can only
be equal or more than zero (see Shkliarevsky,
2011). In the process of construction, the
total amount of entropy is always zero as it
constantly maintains a balance between equilib-
rium and disequilibrium.
The repetition of the cycle of construction
eventually leads to the improvement of the
function of regulation, and the process of con-
struction becomes increasingly more stable,
despite constant changes. One can probably best
describe this dynamic stability as homeorhesis—
the term that was introduced by the biologist
Conrad Waddington—rather than homeostasis.
Homeorhesis is not a static condition and, as such,
requires a stable balance between equilibrium and
disequilibrium. This dynamic balance has a func-
tion of regulation and, as a regulatory operation,
offers a possibility of reﬂecting on the functioning
of the system as a whole (Shkliarevsky, 2007).
The universal knowledge cannot be reduced to
any particular product of the process of construc-
tion. There are no god particles. The search for a
universal knowledge in this direction is utterly
futile. Rather, the universal knowledge can only
be about the common denominator that under-
lies all that have emerged, is emerging and will
emerge in the future. It involves knowledge of
the process of construction itself. This knowledge
is not a lifeless abstraction that lies outside our
daily experience. On the contrary, it is integrally
connected to our life. We just have to know how
to look to recognize this fact. Every phenomenon
that we encounter is a product of the process of
organization in its constant interplay between
equilibrium and disequilibrium. Every level of
organization of reality is a product of equilibra-
tion, and every equilibration creates disequilib-
rium. Observing reality from the vantage point
of this delicate but very stable balance will in-
clude in our ﬁeld of vision not only the particular
phenomenon that we are trying to understand but
also the knowledge of the universal process that
made this and all past, present and future phenom-
ena possible. This conclusion suggests that the
current differentiation between epistemology and
ontology is purely analytical. As this article
suggests, ontology (i.e., what relates to being) and
epistemology (i.e., what relates to knowing) are
intimately connected because, despite isomorphic
differences, the process of construction that under-
lies reality is structurally the same process that we
use in constructing knowledge.
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The perspective that incorporates the process of
construction offers a different approach towards
validating knowledge that is non-exclusive and,
at the same time, non-relativistic. As has been
indicated earlier, the combinatorial power is what
distinguishes one level of organization of reality
from another. Therefore, we can use combinatorial
power—or in other words, inclusiveness—as the
criterion for validating knowledge. Themore inclu-
sive a theory is, the greater is its combinatorial
capacity and, therefore, the greater is its explana-
tory power. For example, non-Euclidean geometry
includes Euclidean geometry as its particular
case with the curvature equal to zero. Therefore,
non-Euclidean geometry has greater explanatory
power. It can operate with both ﬂat and
curved space.
This approach to validation demonstrates a
vital aspect of knowledge production that
resonates with Churchman’s view of cascading
inquiring systems. Knowledge production is
ultimately inclusive. Old theories are not
discarded as a result of the adoption of new
theories; preceding levels of organization are
not obliterated as new ones emerge. On the
contrary, old theoretical perspectives and their
levels of organization are conserved in new and
more comprehensive constructions. They merely
become a particular case of a broader and more
inclusive perspective. It is also a profoundly
democratic approach. All knowledge is part of
our quest, and no knowledge should be excluded.
Legitimate disagreements should not trigger
power struggle where one perspective seeks to
de-legitimate and obliterate another. Rather, they
should motivate a search for another, more
inclusive and even orthogonal perspective that
would dissolve the dissonance into a newharmony.
Such approach stands in stark contrast to
the dominant current practice of knowledge
production that tends to be exclusive. Dominant
theoretical perspectives seek to silence alterna-
tives. Control over funding, exposure, publishing
and academic appointments provides ample
opportunities to enforce orthodoxy. More often
than not, knowledge production turns into an
exercise of power.
The driving force in this exercise of power is
fear. The exclusion of the process of construction
from our conception of knowledge production
often leads to uncritical projection of speciﬁc sub-
jective interpretations on reality. Such uncritical
projections foster an institutionally supported
and proliferated illusion in which a particular
theoretical perspective stands for the actual real-
ity. Alternatives that compete with accepted
standard models get little consideration or expos-
ure. Research programs that choose to focus on
other than mainstream approaches are not par-
ticularly high on the list of projects that receive
funding.
Fetishization and absolutization of speciﬁc
constructs is among some of the most adverse
effects of the conception of knowledge produc-
tion that excludes the process of construction.
A limited one-sided consciousness impaired
by this exclusion takes its own projections for
a true reality. As the process of construction
evolves and new forms and levels of
organization of knowledge emerge, such con-
sciousness experiences this legitimate process
as a loss of reality.
There are few traumatic experiences that can
compare to losing one’s ability to understand
and interpret reality. For a consciousness that
undergoes this experience, reality becomes a
void, an abyss devoid of any meaning; or
worse, ﬁlled with negative meaning. In words
of Shakespeare, ‘time comes out of joints’.
Such consciousness develops a sense of disorien-
tation, confusion and fear. To make things worse,
its capacity to cope with this condition is
severely limited to only one cognitive
operation—assimilation. Such consciousness is
incapable of critically examining itself; it simply
cannot see internal sources of its predicament.
Rather, it takes an easier approach: it rejects the
challengers and uses power to silence them.
Thomas Kuhn has discerned the disruptive
effects of such conﬂicts in his Structure of
Scientiﬁc Revolution (Kuhn, 1970).
There is no rational justiﬁcation for resist-
ance to new forms and levels of organization.
These changes do not destroy the old forms.
They conserve them in broader and more
comprehensive visions. When old forms are
subject to pressure of change, we are not
losing reality. On the contrary, it is precisely
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during these transitional moments that we ex-
perience the most direct and most intimate
contact with the ultimate reality—the process
of construction. The focus on the process of
construction helps to understand that it is this
process, its constant and unimpeded evolution,
and not the speciﬁc forms it creates, that we
should view as the only true and desirable
product of our efforts.
The perspective that embraces the process of
construction also recognizes, as Churchman
has, the essential and necessary syncretism of
all human mental activities—a profound
connection between our capacity to create
knowledge and our aesthetic and ethical
values. Gratiﬁcation of our functions is the
source of pleasure and contentment. When we
perform our essential functions—visual, audio,
gustatory, tactile, and others—we exercise these
functions and experience pleasure. A familiar
face activates mental operations in the mind of
a child. Exercising these mental operations grati-
ﬁes and conserves these operations, and the
child experiences a sense of pleasure and
contentment, as he or she does when seeing a
familiar face of the mother.
Construction of knowledge is the most essen-
tial human function. All humans are capable of
performing this profoundly creative act. The
fact that we all become conscious beings by the
end of the ﬁrst year of our lives is a compelling
proof of this capacity. It is hard to overestimate
the magnitude of this creative transformation.
Nothing that we humans have or will accom-
plish—no theory of relativity or quantum
mechanics— will ever exceed in its signiﬁcance
this act of creation. When we construct know-
ledge and perform acts of creation, we exercise
our most essential human functions and, as a
result, we, experience pleasure and content-
ment. It is this pleasure and gratiﬁcation
conferred by the act of creation that is the source
of enjoyment that we associate with aesthetic
value.
Construction of knowledge involves two
basic operations—assimilation and adaptation.
Assimilation is an operation that incorporates
objects of reality into internal functional sche-
mata of the organism. This operation reduces
the multiple and diverse world to the internal
functions of the organism. It is, to be sure, a
violent operation that essentially denies any
autonomy to the reality external to the organism.
Devouring of one organismby another is a good ex-
ample of this operation.
By contrast, adaptation adjusts internal
functions of an organism to reality. Recognition of
autonomy of the reality external to the organism
is essential in this operation. Such recognition is
the basis for the development of moral sentiment
that grants autonomy and agency to other human
beings in our moral universe. Thus, our capacity
for constructing knowledge, that is, exercising both
assimilation and adaptation, is closely related to
our ability to function as moral beings in our
universe. Piaget has noted this connection in his
book The Moral Judgment of the Child (Piaget,
1965). His remark that ‘Logic is the morality of
thought just as morality is the logic of human
action’ is a poignant afﬁrmation of the essential
connection between knowledge and morality
(Nicolopoulou and Weintraub, 1998, p. 222). We
cannot get an objective view of reality if we insist
on viewing reality on our terms, rather than on
its own. Objective knowledge requires granting
the same autonomy to reality and its objects
that we grant to ourselves and others in our
moral universe.
Our civilization ﬁrmly holds on to an inspiring
belief that knowledge is the key to ensuring
unimpeded progress, rational political order,
economic prosperity, judicious use of natural
resources and a world free of wars and violence
(see, e.g., Banathy, 2000; McIntyre-Mills, 2010;
McIntyre-Mills and De Vries, 2011). Both
Churchman and Piaget, among many other
thinkers, fully grasped the importance of under-
standing knowledge production for achieving
these goals. By combining systems thinking with
the constructivist approach, the perspective
outlined in this paper largely builds on their
legacy. Much has been carried out to understand
the speciﬁc aspects of the process of construction,
including works by this author (Shkliarevsky,
2007, 2008, 2010, 2011), but much still has
to be learned. It is the hope of this author
to contribute to further exploration of this
important subject.
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This paper has shown that the problem raised
by Horgan in his book is not a fortuitous one. It
is not due to ignorance, obscurantism or some
insidious agenda. It is deeply rooted in the
views on knowledge production, the relationship
between subject and object, and our relation to
reality—in a word, the philosophical worldview
held by modern science. The resolution of this
problem requires a critical rethinking of this
worldview. This paper suggested some ways in
which this worldview can be revised.
Fundamental revisions are not easy and
are often resisted. There is a reason for such
resistance. Conservation plays a crucial role in
the process of construction. However, conser-
vation inevitably requires regulation, and regu-
lation leads to the emergence of new levels
of organization. This process works in the
universe, and it works in the world of man.
We are its practitioners, and our creativity over
the entire period of human history is a vivid
testimony to this fact. This process has pro-
foundly shaped our civilization and us. Our
intimate relation to this process compels us to
understand it. Such understanding will help
us to practice it more efﬁciently and with
fewer losses. However, most importantly, it
will help us embrace our true destiny in shap-
ing and reshaping reality in our inﬁnite quest
for knowledge.
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